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Abstract 
 
A key stylized fact about transition economies is that the returns to schooling rise as 
economic reform progresses. Existing research suggests that Vietnam is an exception to this 
pattern, with a decrease in males’ return from 1992 to 1998, and little increase in the return to 
females’ education (Liu, 2006). This exception may be because of the gradual economic 
reform applied in Vietnam, whilst in Eastern European countries the “Big Bang” 
transformation was conducted. Therefore to see whether Vietnam is still a counter example, 
we re-examine the trend in the rate of return to schooling in Vietnam over the 1998-2004 
period, where the reforms have had a longer time to have an effect. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A key stylized fact about transition economies is that the returns to schooling tend to rise as 
economic reform progresses (Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995). This rise marks the movement 
away from distorted labor markets and the effects of longer-term changes in patterns of 
human capital formation. Moreover, the increase in returns to schooling in transitional 
economies is especially marked for women, as found in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
(Chase, 1998), and in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, and Poland (Brainerd, 1998). 
 
 Existing research suggests that Vietnam disobeys this pattern. Rates of return were very 
low at the beginning of transition, at only 1.6 percent in 1992 (Glewwe and Patrios, 1998; 
Moock et al, 2003). In contrast, global average rates of returns around the same time were 
nine percent (Psacharopoulos, 1994). But rather than rising through time, estimates reported 
by Liu (2006) suggest falling rate of returns for men in Vietnam from 1992 to 1998 and little 
increase for women. One possible reason for the divergence from the patterns in Eastern 
Europe is that gradual economic reform policies have been applied in Vietnam and the 
Vietnamese government has intervened in the economy substantially, whilst in Eastern 
European countries the “Big Bang” reforms were introduced.  
 
 Therefore to see whether Vietnam is still a counter example, we re-examine the trend in 
the rate of return to schooling in Vietnam over the 1998-2004 period, when the reforms may 
have had longer time to have an effect. Moreover, recent years have seen continued 
development of the private sector which has stimulated competition in the labor market with 
consequent changes in relative wages. Concurrently, income inequality has also risen during 
this later reform period, with the Gini index rising from 0.35 in 1994 to 0.42 in 2002 (GSO, 
2004). Since participation rates in the wage labor market are rising over this period, the 
analysis relies not only on the basic Mincerian earning function but also accounts for sample 
selection bias. Furthermore, since there has been a changing wage premium for state sector 
jobs and a changing share of the wage labor force in the state sector, the analysis also allows 
for endogenous sector choice using a treatment effects estimator to provide more robust 
estimates of the trend in the returns to schooling.  
 
 The next section reviews studies of the returns to schooling in transition economies. 
Section 3 discusses the data and econometric specifications, while Section 4 contains the 
discussion of the results. Discussion of possible explanations for the changing returns and 
conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
 
 
2.  Literature on Return to Schooling in Transition 
 
Existing studies show that rates of return to schooling increase over time in transitional 
economies. For example, returns to schooling increased from 3.6 percent in 1988 to 
12.2 percent by 1993 in China, from 1.5 percent in 1989 to 5.4 percent by 1994 in Estonia, 
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and from 2.9 percent in 1986 to 7 percent by 1996 in Poland (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 
2004, Table A4). Most of these studies use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation which 
does not allow for endogenous school choice, but when Heckman and Li (2004) used 
Instrumental Variables (IV) they found even higher rates of return, of around 14 percent for 
four-year college attendance in China. This compares to rates of return estimated by Chow 
(2001) for China in the 1980s which were much closer to zero. Johnson and Chow (1997) 
note that employment in the stationary public sector which dominated in China’s urban areas 
in the late 1980s leads to lower rates of returns. Zhang, Zhao, Park and Song (2005) also 
suggest that economic reform and technical changes have enhanced competition between 
workers in China, with the newly-skilled rewarded at an increasing rate.  
 
 Yet studies of Vietnam for either the single year 1992 or the 1992-98 period find low 
rates of return to schooling, which show little rise over time (Moock et al, 2003; Glewwe and 
Patrinos, 1998; Liu, 2006; Gallup, 2002). It is notable that the study by Liu (2006) was after 
some period of economic reform yet the estimated rate of return was still low and even 
appeared to slightly decrease for males. However, these studies may not have captured the 
full effects of the transition to a market-oriented economy given the gradual nature of reforms 
in Vietnam. Hence it is important to see what is the trend in the returns to schooling over 
1998-2004.  
 
 In addition to the timing issue, some existing studies on Vietnam ignored the important 
problem of sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). Since there was a rising participation rate 
in the wage labor market during transition this omission may bias not only the level of the 
estimated rate of return but also the trend over time. Consequently, in this paper we control 
for sample selection bias, and also for the related problem of the endogeneity of self-selection 
into the state sector. State sector employment may matter since the wage differentials in state 
enterprises are generally less than those in the private market economy (Johnson and Chow, 
1997). A final weakness of some previous studies on Vietnam is that they merge lower 
secondary and upper secondary education into one group, which is implausible because the 
income differential between the two groups is observed to be quite large (see Table 2). So a 
finer disaggregation of education levels is used in this current study.  
 
 
3.  Data and Model Specification 
 
Data used in this paper are from the 1998 and 2004 rounds of the Vietnam Living Standards 
Survey (VLSS). There are 5,999 households with 28,624 household members in 1998, and 
9,188 households with 40,419 household members in 2004. Only the sub-sample aged from 
15 to 60 are used in the estimation, which yields 3,365 from VLSS1998 (2,009 males and 
1,356 females), and 7,177 from VLSS2004 (4,499 males and 2,678 females).  
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 To estimate the returns to schooling, the Mincerian earnings equation is used:  
 
LnYi = α + β1.Si + β2Expi + β3Expi2 + εi    (1) 
 
where: LnY is the natural log of hourly wages including bonuses, allowances, and subsidies 
(both in cash and in-kind), S is years of schooling,  Exp is potential experience (calculated as 
age minus schooling years minus six) and the experience squared term, Exp2 is added in the 
model to allow a non-linear pattern in lifecycle earnings.  
 
 One drawback of the basic Mincerian earnings function shown is that the coefficient β1 
in equation (1) represents the average rate of returns to one additional year of schooling 
regardless of the level of schooling. Hence it precludes the rate of return varying with 
education levels. To allow for this, an extended earnings function converts continuous years 
of schooling S into dummies representing the different levels of education: 
  
 LnYi = α+ β1Primi +β2lowerSeci +β3 upperSeci +β4Voci +β5 Univi +β7Expi +β8Exp2i + εi   (2) 
 
where: Prim, lowerSec, upperSec, Voc, and Univ are dummy variables representing primary, 
lower secondary, upper secondary, vocational, and university as the highest level of 
schooling of individual i. The estimated coefficients indicate the difference (higher/lower) in 
earnings of a corresponding education level relative to the unschooled reference group. The 
rate of return (r) to each year of schooling of a corresponding each level is calculated as 
follows: 
 r = βj/Sj (3) 
 
where Sj is the years required to complete corresponding education level j in equation (2) 
(j = 1-5 for primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, vocational and university level).  
 
3.1  Sample Selection Bias-Corrected Estimation 
 
Sample selection bias results when the subset of wage earners used for the Mincerian 
earnings function is not randomly sampled from the general population. To address this 
problem we apply the Heckman (1979) sample selection model as follows: 
 
Wage equation:  wi = zi β1 + u1i (4) 
 
where zi is a vector of schooling and experience variable for individual i 
 
Selection equation:  hi* = xi β2 + u2i (5) 
 
where hi* is a latent variable and wi is observed if hi  =1, and hi =1 if  hi* > 0, while wi is not 
observed if hi =0, and hi =0  if  hi* ≤ 0. Furthermore, the assumptions about the errors are that: 
u1i ~ NID(0, σ2) and u2i ~ N(0,1) and cov(u1i, u2i) =  ρ12. 
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 In the first estimation stage, a binary Probit model on all observations (those in wage 
employment and those not) is used to estimate the correction term λi, which is the inverse 
Mill’s ratio or Heckman’s Lambda: λi = φ(xi β2)/Φ( xiβ2). This term is then included in the 
second stage of the augmented earnings function:  
 
wi  =  zi β1 + σ12. λi +  ηi    (6) 
 
  These two equations can also be estimated in one single step, which is more efficient 
(StataCorp, 2001). Identification is achieved by excluding variables (Xi) such as household 
size and household non-wage income from the earnings function but including them in the 
selection equation. The justification for this is that these affect participation probabilities, 
through changing the opportunity cost of being in the wage labor force, but an employer is 
unlikely to pay a different wage rate depending on one’s household size or non-labor income.  
 
 3.2 Correcting for Endogenous Choice of Employment Sector 
 
Workers in the state sector obtain many favorable conditions such as job stability, full labor 
insurance, pension benefits and possibly a wage premium over private sector workers. On the 
other hand, they may face a more compressed wage distribution than private sector workers 
(Johnson and Chow, 1997). While it is possible to include an employment sector variable in 
the earnings equation to allow for these differences, the model must recognize that workers 
may self-select into the state sector rather than being randomly allocated. Consequently, an 
equation should also be estimated for choice of employment sector and if the error term of the 
sector placement equation is correlated with the error term of the wage equation this 
endogenous placement (which can be considered as a “treatment effect”) may cause bias in 
OLS estimated coefficients of the wage equation.  
 
 To overcome this problem, a model for endogenous treatment effects is used as follows:  
 
  wi = zi β +kiψ + ui     (7) 
 
where zi is a vector of schooling and experience variables of individual i, and coefficient ψ 
shows the effect on wages of whether or not the treatment is applied i.e. whether one works 
in the state sector (k=1) or not (k=0). The sector choice depends on a latent variable, ki* with 
the selection equation as follows: 
 
 ki*= yi α + ei      (8) 
  
 ki  = 1 if  ki* > 0 (ki =1 if observations are in state sector) 
 ki  = 0 if  ki* ≤ 0   (ki =0 if observations are in non-state sector) 
 and  ui ~ NID(0, σ2), ei ~ N(0,1), and cov(ui, ei)= ρ 
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 In the first stage of estimation, a binary Probit model for wage earners is employed to 
estimate the determinants of working in the state sector and to derive the correction term or 
Mills’ ratio.  The Mills’ ratio is then included in the augmented earnings equation. In contrast 
to the sample selectivity correction, there is a Mills’ ratio for both the treated and untreated 
observations.  Identification is achieved by including a variable in the sector choice equation 
which is not in the earnings function.  Previous studies have used the share of the household 
workers (excluding the ith individual) who are in the state sector as the identifying variable 
(Gibson and Fatai, 2006), since some personal contacts may be needed to get one of these 
preferred jobs, and the same approach is used here.  
 
 
4.  Results 
 
The descriptive statistics show that the educational attainment of wage earners in Vietnam 
averages about 9 years, and by 2004 was slightly higher for females than males (Appendix 
A). This gender pattern reflects the fact that female wage earners are a more selected sample 
than are male wage earners (27 percent of the working age females are in wage labor versus 
42 percent of the males), so amongst non-wage earners women’s education is lower than 
men’s. The average hourly wage rate was 2,513 dong (US$0.18) in 1998 and in nominal 
terms had risen to 4,566 dong (US$0.29) by 2004. The average wage rates of women are 
lower than for men, but were rising faster, from 77 percent of the male average in 1998 to 
91 percent by 2004. 
 
 Table 1 contains the basic earnings function estimates. All of the coefficients are 
significant at the one percent level but the explanatory power of the model is substantially 
higher in 2004 than in 1998. The coefficient on years of schooling implies an average private 
rate of return to an additional year of education of 2.7 percent in 1998 rising to 8.4 percent in 
2004, for the model with males and females pooled together. These results are in sharp 
contrast to those of Liu (2006) who found static or declining rates of return between 1992 and 
1998. However the results are quite consistent with what is found in other transition 
economies (e.g., Zhang et al., 2005) report a seven percentage point rise in the rate of return 
to schooling in China from four percent in 1988 to ten percent in 2001). 
 
 The rise over time in the rate of return to education is shared by both men and women. 
Specifically, the rate of return to an extra year of schooling rose by 5.4 percentage points for 
males (from 2.2 to 7.6 percent) and by 6.6 percentage points for women (from 3.6 to 
10.2 percent). However, even though the rate of return is higher and rose faster for women, 
their level of returns is still lower than for men. According to the coefficient on the male 
intercept dummy variable in the first column of Table 1, hourly wages were 14.5 percent 
higher for men than for similarly educated and experienced women in 1998. 1   This 
percentage gap was almost unchanged in 2004. 
                                                 
1 The percentage is calculated for dummy variables in a semi-logarithmic regression as 100 x (eβi -1).  
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Table 1: Basic Mincerian Earning Function Estimates 
Variable 1998 2004 
All  Male  Female  All  Male  Female 
Years of schooling 0.0274 
(7.60)** 
0.022 
(4.35)**
0.036 
(7.69)**
0.0864 
(35.52)**
0.076 
(24.14)** 
0.102 
(26.74)**
Years of 
experience 
0.015 
(3.95)** 
0.0118 
(2.24)*
0.017 
(3.38)**
0.0245 
(8.03)**
0.024 
(6.22)** 
0.025 
(4.89)**
Experience 
squared 
-0.00055 
(5.7)** 
-0.00056 
(5.65)**
-0.0005 
(3.68)**
-0.0005 
(6.11)**
-0.0005 
(5.06)** 
-0.0004 
(3.16)**
Sex (male=1) 0.136 
(4.66)** 
0.134 
(7.05)**
 
Constant   0.291 
(6.97)** 
0.527 
(9.61)**
0.148 
(2.99)**
0.223 
(6.70)** 
0.464 
(11.36)** 
0.049 
(1.00)
R2 0.0526 0.0448 0.0684 0.1825 0.1497 0.2267
F-statistics 38.91**  23.2** 36.0** 356.35** 213.5** 262.6**
No of obs 3,365 2,009 1,356 7,177 4,499 2,678
Notes:  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), and at 1% (**); dependent 
variable: hourly wage in log, hourly wage is measured in VND 1,000 (and for all Tables hereafter). 
  
  
4.1 Changes in Returns to Educational Levels 
 
The basic Mincerian earnings function is convenient because the returns to schooling are a 
single parameter but it is also interesting to consider an extended earnings function where 
each educational level has a separate parameter. These extended results are reported in 
Table 2 with five educational levels specified: primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, 
vocational and university. The excluded base category is those with no education. 
 
 It is apparent that the wage gaps between higher education groups and the group with no 
education have widened over time. In 1998, those whose highest education was upper 
secondary were rewarded 21.3 percent [=100 x (e0.193 -1)] more than the no-schooling group, 
but by 2004 this gap had expanded to 86 percent. An even greater rise is apparent for 
university graduates, whose hourly wage was 88 percent more than the base group in 1998 
but 245 percent more in 2004.  
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Table 2: The Mincerian earning function estimations for educational level 
Variable 1998 2004 
All Male Female All Male Female 
Years of 
experience 
0.018 
(4.76)** 
0.015 
(2.81)**
0.019 
(3.74)**
0.025 
(8.36)**
0.024 
(6.49)** 
0.025 
(5.11)**
Experience 
squared 
-0.0006 
(6.6)** 
-0.0006 
(4.9)**
-0.0005 
(4.1)**
-0.0004 
(5.6)**
-0.00046 
(4.7)** 
-0.0004 
(2.9)**
Sex  0.148 
(5.11)** 
0.150 
(8.11)**
 
Primary  0.071 
(1.37) 
-0.021 
(0.28)
0.202 
(2.89)**
0.160 
(2.05)*
0.114 
(1.10) 
0.235 
(2.02)*
Lower 
secondary  
-0.021 
(0.40) 
-0.123 
(1.77)+
0.151 
(2.01)*
0.159 
(2.03)*
0.121 
(1.16) 
0.215 
(1.84)+
Upper 
secondary  
0.193 
(3.35)** 
0.037 
(0.48)
0.448 
(5.59)**
0.620 
(7.84)**
0.473 
(4.51)** 
0.844 
(7.18)**
Vocational  0.106 
(1.40) 
-0.079 
(-0.70)
0.359 
(3.79)**
1.081 
(12.63)** 
0.998 
(8.65)** 
1.206 
(9.68)**
University 0.631 
(9.18)** 
0.626 
(6.36)**
0.692 
(7.52)**
1.239 
(15.26)**
1.133 
(10.49)** 
1.424 
(11.85)**
Constant   0.413 
(7.58)** 
0.722 
(9.54)**
0.196 
(2.91)**
0.588 
(7.38)**
0.827 
(7.82)** 
0.443 
(3.77)**
R2 0.0790 0.0794 0.0873 0.2339 0.2008 0.2827
F-statistics 29.6** 18.2** 19.08** 270.3** 154.2** 165.3**
No of obs 3,365 2,009 1,365 7,177 4,499 2,678
Notes:  See Table 1.  
  
 There was also a very substantial rise in returns to vocational education. In 1998 a 
vocational graduate only earned an hourly wage 11.2 percent higher (and statistically 
insignificantly so) than a similarly experienced person of the same gender who had no 
educational qualifications. But by 2004 the coefficient on the dummy variable for vocational 
qualifications is highly statistically significant and implies an average wage which is 195 
percent higher than the base group. This strong rise in the returns to vocational education 
mirrors a finding by Zhang et al (2005) for China, who explain it by the FDI inflow and 
subsequent tradable goods expansion which led to a high demand for skilled labor. Similarly, 
the rising returns to vocational training in Vietnam may partly reflect the need for skilled 
employees working in factories, given the role of FDI and exports in Vietnam’s transition to a 
market economy. 
 
 The returns to each level of education can also be used to derive rates of return per year, 
under assumptions about the number of years of study needed to progress from one education 
level to the next. In 1998, these percentage rates of return were 1.47, -0.23, 1.77, 0.80 and 
5.50 for primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, vocational and university education 
respectively. But by 2004 there was an across-the-board rise, to percentage rates of return of 
3.5, 1.9, 7.2, 13.9 and 15.3. Except for the dip between primary and lower secondary, the 
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patterns confirm the stylized fact in the literature that rates of return increase with the 
education level (Gibson and Fatai, 2006; Todaro and Smith, 2006). 
 
 The other apparent feature from Table 2 is the higher rates of return to females than to 
males. At all five levels of education specified, and for both years, the coefficients are higher 
for the female sub-sample than the male sub-sample. However, while it appears that family 
investment in female schooling may yield much higher rates of return than a similar 
investment in male children such an inference must be balanced against the much greater 
selectivity of the sample of female wage earners. Since only a small fraction of working-age 
women are in the wage-earning labor force, inferences based on such a selected sample may 
be misleading. 
 
4.2 Changes in Selectivity-Corrected Returns to Education 
 
After correcting for sample selection bias the estimated rates of return to education are 
somewhat higher than in the OLS estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2. However the basic 
feature of the data, of a significant rise in the rates of return between 1998 and 2004, is not 
altered. The full results of using the Heckman (1979) selection-correction are reported in 
Table 3, alternately measuring education by years of schooling or with five dummy variables 
for the highest level of education. These estimates are made on samples which pool males 
and females, since the maximum likelihood estimator of the selection correction model 
requires large samples. Hence the results in Table 3 are most comparable with the results in 
the “All” columns of Tables 1 and 2.   
 
The rise in the average private rate of return to a year of schooling is illustrated in Figure 1, 
for both the OLS and selectivity-corrected estimates. Both sets of estimates show a rise of 
over five percentage points between 1998 and 2004. The rise in the returns to various levels 
of education is illustrated in Figure 2, with just the results from the selectivity-corrected 
estimates shown. The returns rise at all levels of education, with the second highest rise, of 
over ten percentage points, at university level and the highest rise, of 15 percentage points, at 
vocational level.  
 
 The estimates of the selection and wage equations show that the residuals are positively 
correlated, for both years and regardless of whether education is measured by school years or 
by highest level. Specifically, the coefficient on the inverse Mills’ ratio, λ varies from 0.16 to 
0.29 and is always highly statistically significant. This implies a positive correlation between 
the selection equation errors and the wage equation errors, since λ=ρσ (and σ must be 
positive). In other words, individuals with a comparative advantage in entering the wage-
earning labor force also have a comparative advantage in earning more than observationally 
similar workers. Hence the observed wage is higher than the wage that would prevail for a 
sample of individuals selected at random from the working-age population.  
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Figure 1:  OLS and selection-bias corrected returns to an additional year of schooling 
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Figure 2:  Selection-bias corrected average returns to educational levels 
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation for Selection and Wage equation 
 
 
Variable  
1998 2004 1998  2004 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
School year 0.052 
(14.25)** 
0.0376 
(9.45)** 
0.0745 
(21.56)** 
0.094 
(31.8)**
    
Primary     -0.124 
(2.42)* 
0.042 
(0.78) 
-0.049 
(0.58) 
0.151 
(1.92)+ 
Lower 
secondary  
   -0.037 
(0.73) 
-0.037 
(0.69) 
-0.123 
(1.46) 
0.136 
(1.73)+ 
Upper 
secondary  
   0.241 
(4.29)** 
0.228 
(3.89)** 
0.219 
(2.54)* 
0.625 
(7.85)** 
Vocational     0.500 
(7.33)** 
0.189 
(2.44)* 
1.345 
(10.47)** 
1.178 
(13.29)** 
University     0.848 
(11.7)** 
0.767 
(10.6)** 
1.719 
(14.7)** 
1.343 
(15.73)** 
Experience 0.00129 
(0.49) 
0.016 
(4.08)** 
0.0949 
(31.8)** 
0.0398 
(10.2)**
0.003 
(1.16) 
0.019 
(4.92)** 
0.091 
(30.19)** 
0.035 
(9.61)** 
Experience 
squared 
-0.0003 
(4.72)** 
-0.0006 
(6.33)** 
-0.0025 
(30.15)** 
-0.0009 
(8.53)**
-0.0003 
(5.76)** 
-0.0007 
(7.10)** 
-0.002 
(28.56)** 
-0.0007 
(7.33)** 
Sex (male=1) 0.473 
(21.14)** 
0.245 
(7.60)** 
0.466 
(22.3)** 
0.203 
(9.13)**
0.482 
(21.49)** 
0.245 
(7.66)** 
0.481 
(22.55)** 
0.200 
(9.52)** 
Household 
size 
-0.0176 
(2.81)** 
 0.035 
(5.20)** 
-0.016 
(2.54)* 
 0.037 
(5.25)** 
 
Non-wage 
income(a) 
-0.0735 
(7.69)** 
 -0.182 
(14.89)** 
-0.0778 
(7.92)** 
 -0.196 
(15.13)** 
 
Constant  -0.436 
(25.28)** 
-0.282 
(3.39)** 
-1.61 
(28.99)** 
-0.184 
(2.45)*
-1.060 
(16.21)** 
-0.016 
(0.20) 
-0.995 
(10.48)** 
0.349 
(3.66)** 
lambda  (λ) 
 
0.289 
(8.51)** 
0.219 
(6.07)**
0.254 
(6.95)** 
0.161 
(4.62)** 
Wald χ2 (all 
slopes=0)  
203.4** 1051.8** 276.86** 1282.3** 
Selectivity 
test: ρ=0 
χ2(1) = 67.93** χ2(1) = 36.49** χ2(1)=48.69** χ2(1)=21.46** 
No of obs 22,591 3,365 20,549 7,177 22,591 3,365 20,549 7,177 
Notes:  
Dependent variable of the selection equation (observed wage earner =1, non-wage earner=0), dependent variable of wage 
equation is hourly wage in log. The (absolute) z-statistics in parentheses, statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), 
and at 1% (**); (a) Total household non-wage income divided by 10,000. 
 
 The positive coefficients on either school years or on the dummy variables for higher 
levels of education in the selection equations show a benefit of education which is omitted 
from standard wage equations, which is that it provides a higher probability of entering into 
wage work. To help interpret this effect, the probit coefficients from the selection equation 
are transformed into marginal effects, showing the change in probability of being in wage 
employment for a unit change in the explanatory variable. These equations are also estimated 
on separate sub-samples for males and females, with the results displayed in Table 4. 
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Table 4:   Marginal effects of characteristics on probability of wage employment 
Variable 1998 2004 
 All Male Female All Male Female 
School year 0.0104 0.0102 0.0098 0.0260 0.0210 0.0289 
 (13.79)** (7.67)** (11.22)** (20.98)** (11.75)** (17.25)** 
Experience -7.81e-06 0.0071 -0.0041 0.0350 0.0484 0.0214 
 (0.01) (6.89)** (7.22)** (32.49)** (31.14)** (15.04)** 
Exp squared -.00005 -0.00021 0.00004 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0006 
 (4.52)** (9.08)** (3.04)** (30.70)** (28.13)** (15.30)** 
Sex(a)  0.1007 0.1672   
 (20.68)** (22.41)**   
Household size -0.0024 -0.0050 -0.0009 0.0146 0.0089 0.0161 
 (1.81)+ (2.18)* (0.59) (5.89)** (2.59)** (4.75)** 
Non_wage  income/10,000 -0.0139 -0.0246 -0.0073 -0.0651 -0.0845 -0.0468 
(7.35)** (7.51)** (3.91)** (14.52)** (14.46)** (8.38)** 
Wald chi2 923.06** 255.52** 350.04** 1789.4** 1231.7** 541.2** 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Probability of being wage-
earner at x-bar 
0.1314 0.1989 0.0917 0.3405 0.4184 0.2642 
Observations 22,815 9,689 13,126 20,852 10,778 10,074 
Notes:  Robust z-statistics in parentheses, statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*) and at 1% (**), (a) dy/dx 
is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
  
 There appears to be a substantial rise over time in the impact of education on the 
probability of being in wage employment. In 1998 each additional year of schooling raised 
the probability by just over one percentage point (averaged over males and females). But by 
2004 the marginal effect of an extra year of schooling had risen to 2.6 percentage points. In 
other words, people with higher education have a higher likelihood of having wage jobs and 
the strength of this relationship increased over time. It is also notable that in both years the 
marginal effect of education was higher for females than for males, which is consistent with 
the pattern of female wage workers being a more educationally selected group than the male 
wage workers. 
 
 The final notable result from Table 4 is the overall rise in the predicted probability of 
wage employment for an individual with average characteristics, increasing from 13 percent 
in 1998 to 34 percent in 2004. This rapid increase in the probability of being in wage work is 
likely due to the rapid industrialization in Vietnam’s urban and peri-urban areas which have 
helped absorb surplus labor from rural areas. The increasing significance of household size as 
a positive predictor of wage employment is also consistent with this surplus labor 
interpretation; the opportunity cost of having a household member work in wage employment 
is lower for a larger family since other family members can continue to work either on-farm 
or in some non-farm informal enterprise. 
 14
4.3 Changing returns to education with endogenous sector choice 
\ 
The econometric evidence reported above on the rapid rise in the returns to schooling does 
not account for one possible confounding factor which is the role of the state sector. Prior to 
the 1990s when Vietnam was still a command economy the government set wage scales and 
the state budget was allocated to employees via state enterprises and administrative units. But 
economic reform led to public sector downsizing and private sector employment increasing 
rapidly. In fact by 2005 the private sector provided 88.3 percent of total employment while 
the state sector contributed only 11.7 percent (Duong Ngoc, 2006, p.39).  
 
 Although the state sector in Vietnam is a small contributor to employment it is a major 
contributor to industrial output and a major destination for investment. In 2005 the state 
sector received just over one-half of the total capital in the economy and contributed 39.3 
percent of GDP (Ngoc Lam, 2006). Thus the state sector is capital-intensive and also enjoys 
privileges from monopolies in many highly profitable sectors of the economy such as mineral 
and oil exploitation, telecommunications, construction, airlines, transportation, and power 
supply. Workers in the state sector are therefore likely to be paid a wage premium since they 
have more capital to work with and there is the possibility of monopoly rents to be shared. 
Consequently, changes in the state sector wage premium and also in the changing share of the 
state sector in total wage employment could affect the trend in the rate of return to schooling. 
 
 To see whether the pattern of rising returns to schooling is robust, augmented Mincerian 
wage equations were estimated where along with schooling, experience and gender there is 
also a dummy variable for whether the job was in the state sector. This sector variable is 
treated as endogenous since workers are likely to purposively rather than randomly choose 
which sector to work in. The results in Table 5 support the decision to treat the employment 
sector as endogenous, since there is a significant (at the one percent level) correlation 
between the disturbances of the sector choice equation and the wage equation.  
 
 A large part of the returns to schooling appears to operate through the impact that 
schooling has on the sector of employment. The probit coefficients from the selection 
equation imply that an additional year of schooling raised the probability of wage workers 
being in the state sector by 0.3 percentage points in 1998 and by a much more substantial 2.8 
percentage points in 2004. Since there appears to be a large state sector wage premium, of 22 
percent in 1998 and 86 percent in 2004, a big part of the return to education is through the 
raised probability it provides of obtaining a high-paying state sector job. Once this factor is 
controlled for, the directly estimated rate of return to an extra year of schooling is lower than 
in the basic Mincerian wage equation, at 1.6 percent in 1998 and 4.7 percent in 2004. 
However, even these lower rates of return, which are applicable to private sector workers, 
represent a large rise from 1998 to 2004. In that respect, the basic pattern established from the 
previous results where employment sector is not accounted for still stand. 
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Table 5: Returns to schooling with endogenous self-selection into the state sector  
Variable 1998 2004 
Selection 
Equation
Wage 
Equation
Selection 
Equation 
Wage 
Equation 
School year 0.093 
(6.46)**
0.016 
(3.33)**
0.228 
(32.37)** 
0.047 
(12.08)** 
Experience 0.026 
(2.43)*
0.013 
(3.37)**
0.045 
(7.34)** 
0.018 
(5.77)** 
Experience squared -0.00014 
(0.58)
-0.0005 
(5.59)**
-0.0003 
(1.76)+ 
-0.0005 
(5.73)** 
Sex (male=1) 0.016 
(0.18)
0.158 
(4.38)**
-0.272 
(7.07)** 
0.179 
(9.24)** 
Sector (state=1) 0.199 
(7.78)**
 0.622 
(13.43)** 
Public sector labor share  5.55 
(17.39)**
6.95 
(3.8)** 
 
Constant  -3.033 
(17.59)**
0.346 
(7.87)**
-4.012 
(17.0)** 
0.455 
(12.45)** 
lambda  (λ) -0.092 
(2.75)**
-0.189 
(7.39)** 
Wald χ2 (5) (all slopes=0)  179.82 1543.48 
Rho (ρ ) -0.114 -0.269 
Wald test of independent equations 
(ρ=0) 
χ2(1)=7.40** χ2(1)=52.5** 
No of observations 3,365 7,177 
Note:  
Dependent variable of the selection equation (wage earner in state sector =1, wage earner in non-state sector=0). 
Dependent variable of wage equation is log of hourly wage. The (absolute) z-statistics in parentheses, 
statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*) and at 1% (**). 
 
  
 A notable feature of the estimates for the model with endogenous state sector 
employment is that some factors which raise the probability of working in the state sector 
lower the wage. For example, in 2004 a male wage worker was 24 percent less likely to be in 
the state sector than a female worker with the same schooling, experience and family network 
of state sector workers. Yet males earn a considerable wage premium over females so the 
selection mechanism for state sector jobs appears to go in the opposite direction to what 
comparative advantage would predict. This pattern is also apparent from the significant 
negative coefficients on the Mills’ ratios in each year, which implies a negative correlation 
between the selection equation errors and wage equation errors and suggests that there may 
be some non-market aspects to state sector employment. 
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5.  Discussion and Conclusions  
 
The results reported in this paper on returns to schooling in Vietnam using VLSS1998 and 
VLSS2004 differ very substantially from previous literature. The rates of return for 2004 are 
much higher than estimates for either 1992 or 1998 reported by Glewwe and Patrios (1998), 
Gallup (2002), Moock et al (2003) and Liu (2006). Moreover, while Liu (2006) found a 
declining trend between 1992 and 1998 in the rates of return for men and essentially no trend 
for women, the current results show a very rapid rise in the rates of return to schooling 
between 1998 and 2004. The increased rates of return are especially marked for women and 
for workers with post-secondary (i.e., vocational or university) level education. The trend of 
increased rates of return appears to be robust to both forms of self-selection considered, that 
of selection into the wage labor force and selection into a state sector job. 
 
 What could account for such a rapid rise in the rates of return to schooling, especially 
given the previously sluggish change reported in the literature? The period studied here 
coincides with further opening by Vietnam and integration into the global economy, deeper 
reforms, and a consequent investment boom with accelerated structural change that has 
generated many technical-skilled jobs. Investment grew dramatically, from 32 percent of 
GDP in 1998 to 38.4 percent in 2004, with almost all of this investment into industry and 
services (Vietnam Economic Times, 2007). Consequently, the contribution of industry to 
GDP rose from 32.5 percent in 1998 to 40.2 percent in 2004 while low-productivity 
agriculture reduced its role in GDP from 26 percent down to 22 percent (Vietnam Economic 
Times, 2006, p.64). There was also considerable growth in foreign trade, such that overall 
openness (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) reached 127 percent by 2004. 
 
 In terms of reforms, changes in labor market laws from the early 1990s were having 
increasing effects in the period studied. Initial reforms in 1993 to the labor contract system 
introduced the “basic wage” as the minimum wage. But employers often relied on the basic 
wage to compute actual wages for employees without concern for appropriate differentials for 
educational attainment, skills and productivity. Further impetus for negotiating and signing 
employment contracts came in 1994 when the Labor Code was passed, allowing employers 
more flexibility in hiring and firing workers. This greater flexibility is also likely to have 
offered greater mobility for workers, allowing the more highly schooled to seek out jobs 
which paid appropriate wage differentials for their skills. Moreover, these more educated 
workers may have benefitted from the transfers of technical and managerial skills that the 
boom in FDI is likely to have caused. 
 
 It is unlikely that the forces behind the rapid rise in the returns to schooling in Vietnam 
had reached their peak by 2004. Vietnam joined the WTO in 2006 with a commitment to 
further opening of markets, including the labor market, so growing competition between 
employers is likely to affect the returns to schooling. In this regard it is notable that even 
though the largest rise in returns to education between 1998 and 2004 was for those with 
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post-secondary vocational qualifications, there may still be insufficient supply of graduates in 
this skill category. According to Ngoc Dao (2007, p.21-23) the structure of education and 
training in Vietnam has been inappropriate, and Vietnam is now facing the problem of an 
“excess of teachers-university graduates but shortage of skilled-workers”. Indeed, less than 
one-third of the tertiary educated wage earners in the VLSS2004 sample were technical and 
vocational graduates, yet this may be the group who benefit the most from the boom in 
foreign investment and the rising demand for technically skilled workers. Hence a continued 
rise in the rates of return to schooling is likely, making Vietnam less of a contrary case to the 
pattern observed in other transition economies. 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Mean and standard deviation of variables of wage earner sub-sample 
 
Variable 
All  Male  Female  
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
VLSS 1998  
Hourly wage rate 2.513 2.412 2.771 2.642 2.147 1.987 
Schooling years 9.070 3.907 9.097 3.800 9.032 4.054 
Experience 15.732 11.553 16.852 11.650 14.142 11.227 
Age (year) 32.167 11.992 33.253 12.131 30.625 11.622 
Non-wage earners’ 
schooling years  
7.642 3.604 8.121 3.533 7.330 3.616 
No of wage earners 3,365 2,009 1,356  
Fraction of working 
age who are wage 
earners 
 
14.9% 20.9% 10.4%  
VLSS 2004 
Hourly wage rate 4.566  4.351  4.726  4.480  4.302  4.115  
Schooling years 9.065  3.581  8.902  3.534  9.337  3.642  
Experience  17.155  10.744  17.951  10.742  15.840  10.620  
Age (year) 33.567 10.803 34.242 10.850 32.451 10.634 
Non-wage earners’ 
schooling years  
8.220 2.857 8.396 2.848 8.071 2.856 
No of wage earners 7,177 4,499 2,678  
Fraction of working 
age who are wage 
earners 
34.9% 42.4% 27.0%  
Sources: VLSS1998 and VLSS2004. Hourly wage rates are in 1,000 Vietnam Dong, and in 1998 the 
average exchange rate was 13,765 Dong/USD and 15,676 Dong/USD in 2004. 
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